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1 Introduction
With the global growth in car use, infrastructure is becoming an increasingly scarce commodity.
For example, in 2007 Schrank and Lomax (2007) of the Texas Transportation Institute estimated
that the annual cost of congestion to the US economy was around 78 billion USD. This presents
a significant challenge to policy makers. A number of options are available. Supply can be
increased, although this can be costly and may induce fresh demand (Small and Verhoef, 2007
p. 176) or demand can be managed. The introduction of full marginal cost road pricing is one
way to reduce demand. The principal is well understood theoretically and has been studied
extensively empirically (Winston and Langer, 2006).
The problem of traffic congestion has many dimensions. Policy makers must consider dis-
tributional, environmental, efficiency and political factors. All of these aspects have received
attention in the literature. However, one area which is usually neglected is the effect on the
labour market. Transport infrastructure and policy can have serious effects on flows of com-
muters, migrants and on the distribution of unemployment. For example, in a study of highway
investment Winston and Langer (2006) choose to ignore what they call ‘second order effects’,
by which they mean labour market outcomes. Eliasson (2009) conducts a cost benefit analysis
of congestion charging in Sweden but makes no reference to labour market effects. Graham and
Glaister (2006) consider the spatial impacts of congestion pricing but also neglect the implica-
tions for regional disparities.
There are many reasons for the lack of attention given to labour market impacts of congestion
charging. Firstly, there is no clear way to value an even distribution of employment or population.
Secondly, it is very difficult to model given that commuting agents can respond to changes in
the cost of commuting by continuing to commute, migrating or becoming unemployed. This
paper will deal with the problem of modelling the labour market effects of congestion policy by
adopting the agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach used by McArthur et al.
(2008). This approach allows for the simultaneous consideration of commuting, migration and
employment status decisions and offers insight into the way they interact.
The interaction will be analysed by considering a situation where two towns or regions are
linked by infrastructure which suffers from congestion. This can be thought of as a single road
or a road network which suffers from a bottleneck. It would also correspond to a situation where
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towns are linked by a bridge or tunnel. The spatial distribution of employment opportunities
will be altered. This will potentially cause a change in commuting flows. When capacity on such
a resource is limited, a rise in commuting will cause an increase in the level of congestion and
with it a rise in the cost of commuting. This generates external costs which are not accounted
for by an agent making a decision whether to commute or not. Different policy options will
be considered and the effect on the distribution of the population and unemployment will be
analysed as well as the aggregate utility level of agents in the model.
The analysis will show that the ability of a congestion charge to improve social welfare
depends on labour market conditions and the geographical distribution of employment and
workers. Congestion charging attempts to deliver improvements in welfare be discouraging
commuters who have a private marginal benefit below the marginal social cost. However, as
this paper will show, the welfare implications of this will depend on the subsequent actions of
these displaced commuters. In particular it depends on whether they choose to substitute the
commuting trip with a migration response. These decisions by agents will also impact upon the
pattern of regional disparities.
This interaction between road pricing and spatial labour market outcomes has important
policy implications. It is not simply the case that road pricing has an impact on regional
disparities but that it actively depends on creating disparities of one kind or another in order
to influence the number of commuters. The welfare implications will depend on what kind of
disparity is created i.e. a population or unemployment disparity. This also implies that use of
road pricing and the aim of closing regional disparities are, at least to some degree, incongruous.
The paper is structured as follows. Details of the ACE approach adopted will be presented
in Section 2. Section 3 will outline the experiments conducted using the model and present
the results. Section 4 considers the merits of using the proceeds of road pricing to improve
infrastructure while Section 5 provides some concluding remarks and policy implications of the
results.
2 Model
This paper adopts an agent based computational economics (ACE) approach (Tesfatsion; 2001,
2003). The approach derives macroeconomic results not by working with aggregate relation-
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ships but by modelling the behaviour of individual, utility maximising agents. Any phenomena
observed in such models has clear microeconomic foundations. This has obvious applications to
the current problem. There is no need to define when people will choose to commute, migrate or
enter unemployment, all that is needed is to define utility functions for the individuals. Precise
details of the simulation model used in this paper are given in McArthur et al. (2008). A very
brief outline is given here.
An artificial population of utility maximising agents is generated. Agents in the model
are born, they age, marry, give birth, divorce, apply for jobs, retire and die. The conditional
probabilities of events such as marriage and giving birth are based on Norwegian statistical
tables. Incorporating as much real world information into simulation models as possible is one
way to help ensure that the results are representative of the real world. An initial population
is created and then the society is allowed to evolve undisturbed over a period of 600 years. The
purpose of this is to ensure the population at the end of the period is demographically identical
to the Norwegian population and that there are no traces of the initial population. The period
could be shorter but as the cost of extending it is low, it may as well be on the upper limit of
what is likely to be required to achieve a representative population.
There are two regions (20km apart) which are separated by a natural barrier such as a fjord,
river or the sea. This scenario is effectively a dynamic version of Dupuit’s Bridge (Dupuit,
1844) as presented in Johansson and Mattsson (1994 pp. 10-15). The advantage of adopting a
simulation methodology over an analytical one is that highly complex situations can be analysed.
Wages are set exogenously and are equal in both areas. It is possible to allow the wage rates to
vary but they are assumed to be exogenous in this paper to simplify the analysis. This represents
a situation where wages are rigid and do not respond to labour market conditions. This is not an
unreasonable assumption to make in many contexts. The endogenous wage mechanism which is
part of the model can be found in McArthur et al. (2008), along with the typical results obtained
when using the mechanism. The number of jobs in the system is set to give an unemployment
rate of around 5.5%. The precise number varies from year to year depending on the population
level. Any adult agent can apply for work and all agents are homogeneous with respect to ability.
A simplified situation with homogeneous jobs and workers is considered.
An agent only applies for work if they will experience a net gain in utility. Successful
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applicants are randomly selected with unfilled vacancies carried over to the next period. No
workers are fired in the model with vacancies only becoming available when workers move, retire
or die. When the number of basic sector jobs decreases due to exogenous changes or through
wage changes, excess workers are shed through natural wastage. This avoids arbitrary decisions
about which workers should be fired and adds realistic friction to the model. Unemployed
workers receive unemployment insurance. Agents in this model gain utility both from money
income and from living in the region in which they were born. Partridge and Rickman (1997) and
Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) also model a situation where people have an emotional attachment
to a particular region. Individuals are equipped with the following utility function:
Uβ(V,W ) = V (e−γd)β (1)
Here V is a money net of commuting costs. More will be said about the cost of commuting
later. It is assumed that agents in the model have a desire to live in the region in which they
were born. Reasons for such attachments to areas are outlined by Partridge and Rickman
(1997). The second component of the utility function describes this attachment where d is the
distance to the individual’s place of birth. The parameters (β and γ) quantify the strength
of the preferences. The distance deterrence parameter γ is constant for all individuals. The
parameter β quantifies how important the individual’s location preference is in determining their
utility. These parameters are drawn randomly at birth. The location preference parameter, β, is
uniformly distributed over the interval (0.5,1). Other types of utility functions and other choices
for the distribution of parameters are of course possible.
2.1 The cost of commuting
In McArthur et al. (2008), it was assumed that the cost of commuting was constant. This
assumption will be relaxed in this paper and the cost of commuting defined as a function of
the number of commuters utilising a road with an assumed capacity limit. This scenario is
relevant in the case of the southern part of western Norway where a high number of islands
and fjords necessitates the use of tunnels and bridges. In many cases, a single bridge or tunnel
provides the only fixed-link between two land masses. When all commuters are forced to use
one network connection in this way, the time taken to make such a journey will depend on the
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number of people making the journey. Because the paper considers the problem of congestion at
a macroscopic scale rather than being concerned with the detailed dynamics of the congestion,
the model applies to any regions linked by infrastructure which experiences congestion.
There are several ways to model this kind of relationship. An approach which has been
used in several studies is the speed-density relationship which relates demand and capacity to
travelling time. The form used here is the same as is presented in Noland (1997 p. 383):
Tij = dij ∗
[
T0 + T1
(
Fij
ω
)ε]
(2)
where Tij is the total time taken to make the journey from i to j, T0 is the time taken to travel
1 km when there is no congestion, T1 measures how quickly the journey time rises as the ratio of
use to capacity changes, Fij is the flow of commuters from i to j, ω is the designed capacity of
the infrastructure and ε is the elasticity of use to capacity. Castillo and Ben´ıtez (1995) provide a
discussion of the history of the speed-density relationship as well as the various functional forms
which have been used. The parameter values used in this paper for T1 and ε are taken from
Noland (1997) and are assumed to be 0.15 and 4 respectively. These estimates are derived from
US data although have been found to be consistent with data from other countries. This travel
time (Tij) must be converted to a cost in order to be incorporated into the simulation. This is
achieved by multiplying Equation 2 by the implied wage per minute. T0 is assumed to be equal
to zero since the purpose of this part of the model is to calculate the cost of congestion, not the
cost of the entire journey. T0 is incorporated into the per km cost of commuting in absence of
congestion i.e. 2.5 NOK.
In the next section, one of the policy options considered is the introduction a congestion
charge. The cost per km of commuting from i to j in this model is based on Equation 2 and is
given by:
Θ = κ+ η
[
T1
(
Fij
ω
)ε]
(3)
where η is the implied wage rate per minute and κ is the cost per km of a journey in the absence
of congestion. The marginal congestion cost imposed by an additional commuter is given by
differentiating Equation 3 with respect to traffic flow and multiplying it by the total number of
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commuters:
Fij
∂Θ
∂Fij
= FijT1εη
[
(Fij/ω)(ε−1)
ω
]
(4)
The total cost of travelling of travelling one kilometre is then obtained by summing 3 and 4
and is presented in Equation 5. This is the congestion charge which will be used in some of the
experiments presented in the next section. This gives a total per km cost of commuting of:
k = κ+ ηT1(1 + ε)
(
Fij
ω
)ε
(5)
This is a standard formulation in time-independent commuting models (Lindsey and Verhoef,
2001). This is the road pricing system which will be used as a possible policy option.
Some technical issued have to be dealt with to utilise this formulation. Firstly, when making
a decision at time t, an individual does not have information on levels of congestion in that
period. This means that they have to form some kind of expectation about how long the
journey will take. In this simulation, adaptive expectations are used i.e. people assume that
commuting costs in month t will be the same as in month t − 1. Secondly, the total level of
welfare in the system with a congestion charge will be influenced by the fact that the congestion
charge is extracted from the system. To avoid this, all congestion charges which are paid are
returned to the system. This is achieved by equally dividing the total sum raised through the
charge by the economically active population i.e. by adding an amount to the wage rate and
unemployment insurance. By leaving the difference between unemployment insurance and the
wage rate unaltered, distortions to the system can be minimised.
2.2 Moving costs
In the same way that road capacity is a scarce resource, housing and land suitable for the
construction of houses is also scarce. To account for this, the cost of moving from one region to
another was specified as a function of the population of the receiving region. This corresponds
to a situation where the supply of housing or land is limited. In this way, an agent moving from
one region to another causes a rise in the cost of moving to the receiving region and a fall in the
cost of moving to the sending region. The cost of moving to a region is calculated as:
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mij = TC + ((1 +
Pj
P
)λ)− ((1 + Pi
P
)λ) (6)
where TC is transaction costs, Pi is the population in Town i, P is the total population of both
towns and λ is a parameter modelling the sensitivity of moving costs to asymmetries in the
distribution of the population. This elasticity was set equal to 25. This gives modest changes
in the cost of moving as the ratio of population changes. The mechanisms is specified such that
if the population is exactly equally distributed between the towns then the cost of moving is
simply equal to the transaction costs. The congestion component in this mechanism represents
a change in land or house prices. As a result, agents must pay the transaction costs and the
difference in land prices. If an agent moves from a densely populated town to a smaller town,
they will receive the difference as a benefit. This would correspond to a real world situation
where someone moves from a high priced city to a low price rural area, for example.
3 Experiments
An economy with two towns located 20 km apart is generated using the model. There is a
population of around 33,000 in the model, approximately equally divided between these towns.
3.1 The introduction of a one-time shock
In this set of experiments, an employment shock (-20% jobs in Region 1) is introduced into the
system in order to monitor how it responds and what the labour market outcomes are. The
experiment will be repeated under three different sets of conditions:
• Unlimited commuting capacity
• Limited capacity where the cost of commuting is determined by the flow in each direction
• Limited capacity where commuters are charged the full marginal cost of their commuting
trip
Figure 1 shows the differential between unemployment rates in the towns in each system. A
difference of zero indicates that the shock has been spread out equally.
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Figure 1: Unemployment differential (T1-T2) with a 20% reduction in employment opportunities
in Region 1 in year 10. Scenarios denoted by: Uncongested - solid line, Congested - dashed line
and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
Initially, all three systems have an equal distribution of unemployment. This is to be expected
since employment opportunities and the population are equally distributed between towns. The
employment shock causes a small disparity in all three scenarios. The disparity is largest when
a congestion charge is introduced. At it’s peak, a disparity of almost 2% is observed in the
system with a charge. No significant disparity exists in any of the systems. The lack of a
large disparity means that some of the newly unemployed workers in the first town join the
workforce of the second town, either through commuting or migration. Because the cost of
commuting is different across the three systems, the proportion who commute and migrate
is likely to be different. Figure 2 shows the population differential between the towns. This
provides information on how many people migrate.
The population begins equally spread out between the two towns, as shown in Figure 2.
There is a migration response to the employment shock in all three systems with the size of the
response depending on the cost of commuting. The system with the highest cost of commuting,
i.e. with a road pricing, responds the most to the shock. This is to be expected since moving
becomes more attractive when compared with commuting as its cost rises. In reality, the large
shift in population from one town to the other is likely to give rise to indirect and induced
effects, exacerbating the disparities between the towns.
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Figure 2: Population differential (T1-T2) with a 20% reduction in employment opportunities in
Region 1 in year 10. Scenarios denoted by: Uncongested - solid line, Congested - dashed line
and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
This highlights the importance of the simultaneous consideration of migration and commut-
ing. As the cost of commuting rises, an individual’s incentives change. Firstly they are less
likely to commute. This can result in one of two things happening. Firstly, they may choose
to become unemployed if the utility of unemployment is greater than the utility of commuting.
They may also choose to substitute their commute with migration. The order of preferences will
depend on the characteristics of the individual concerned, wages and the level of unemployment
insurance. Failure to consider migration, commuting and employment decisions simultaneously
will give biased results. In this model, agents make decisions about whether to migrate or com-
mute based on their expected level of utility from the action. Figure 3 presents the average
worker utility.
Unsurprisingly, the highest level of utility is achieved when there is no congestion on the
intercity link. The results with respect to congestion charging are a little more surprising. The
introduction of a charge appears to approve utility but only marginally; if at all. The reason for
such a small difference lies in the relationship between migration and commuting. Consider first
the aim of a congestion charge. Market failure results from the fact that from an individuals
perspective, they should commute so long as the marginal benefit is greater than the cost they
will have to pay to commute i.e. the average cost. From society’s perspective, they should
commute only if the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal social cost of the commuting. The
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Figure 3: Utility per worker with a 20% reduction in employment opportunities in Region 1 in
year 10. Scenarios denoted by: Uncongested - solid line, Congested - dashed line and Congestion
Charge - dotted line.
optimal charge aims to align the interests of the individual with the interests of society. In such
a case, society will make a saving equal to the cost of commuting in a sub-optimal equilibrium
minus the cost of commuting in an optimal equilibrium.
The problem with the reasoning here is that it makes certain assumptions about what hap-
pens to the agents who stop commuting due to the introduction of the charge. The optimal
response of the agents from a individual and societal perspective is different. Individuals in the
model have two components to their preferences: money and location. From a social standpoint,
it is best that all workers live in the region in which they were born and work in that region.
Subject to a sufficient labour supply in both towns to fill all vacancies, no migration or com-
muting should take place. In such a case, the average utility is given by evaluating the utility
function with average values from the population:
Uβ(V,W ) = population ∗ (u ∗ 300, 000 + (1− u)400, 000)(e−0.005∗0)0.75 (7)
where u is the unemployment rate. If everyone lives in the region in which they were born then
the average distance becomes zero and the location component of the utility function can be
ignored. A situation with no migration or commuting would not be arrived at without some
kind of intervention. This would increase the average distance from the region of birth and
would reduce social utility. This is because an agent will migrate so long as the present value
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of the expected income stream exceeds the cost of living away from their home region (and the
one-off pecuniary moving costs). Taking a job in this region will deprive one of the residents of
that region a job which will, in turn, cause them to be unemployed or engage in costly moving
or commuting. The more people engaged in this activity, the lower the level of social utility.
This is the explanation for the minor difference in utility shown in Figure 3. While there is
a social cost saving from the elimination of excessive commuting, additional costs are incurred
due to the increased level of migration shown in Figure 2. It is worth noting that these are
mainly the psychological costs of moving as the patterns observed persist in the long run. This
would not be the case if the observations were only due to transaction costs incurred during the
adjustment period. In order to further investigate the interaction between commuting, migration
and utility under a congestion charging regime, the distance between the towns was increased
from 20 km to 50 km.
3.2 An increase in distance from 20 km to 50 km
This section deals with the same experiment as the previous section but with the distance
between the towns increased from 20 to 50 km. The logic remains the same although the real
world interpretation of the scenario changes. The two towns can now be thought of either as
towns or as two regions. These regions are linked by infrastructure which experiences congestion.
This could be because part of the infrastructure is a bridge or tunnel but could simply reflect
poor transport links between the regions perhaps due to topographical reasons or due to lack
investment in the past. Whatever the reason, it is assumed some kind of bottleneck exists in
the system which limits the ability of traffic to flow between the regions.
Increasing the distance between the towns in the model has a number of effects in the model.
Commuting becomes more expensive due to the increased distance. The transaction costs of
moving are assumed to remain constant but the psychological cost increases. This decreases the
attractiveness of both migration and commuting and makes the emergence of regional disparities
more likely. The precise results of an increase in distance are difficult to predict. The increased
cost of moving will increase the willingness to pay for commuting and vice versa. In addition to
this, the increase in psychological costs varies across workers. As a result, it is difficult to say
a priori what the outcome will be. Figure 4 shows the unemployment disparities generated by
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the same employment shock used in the last experiment but with a distance of 50 km.
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Figure 4: Unemployment differential (T1-T2) with a 20% reduction in employment opportunities
in Region 1 in year 10. Scenarios denoted by: Congested - dashed line and Congestion Charge
- dotted line.
There are two important points to note about Figure 4. The first is that the increase in
the distance between the areas now causes an unemployment disparity to emerge when the
employment shock is experienced in Town 1. The second point is that the disparity is much
worse when a congestion charge is levied. The utility level per worker is presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Utility per worker with a 20% reduction in employment opportunities in Region 1 in
year 10. Scenarios denoted by: Congested - dashed line and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
In contrast to the results when the distance was 20 km, a distance of 50 km gives a situation
where the introduction of a congestion charge significantly improves utility. This result is entirely
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consistent with the explanation proposed in the previous section. With a distance of 20 km,
there was little or no improvement in utility when using a congestion charge. This was a result
of the fact that the agents who were discouraged from commuting migrated to the other town
instead. This caused them to incur moving costs which lowered the gain which society would
have realised had they not have moved. With a distance of 50 km, a far smaller proportion
of the agents who were priced out of commuting substituted the commuting with a migration
response. Instead, they became unemployment.
In the model, the socially optimum response for displaced commuters is to become unem-
ployed. This is because social utility is maximised when all vacancies are filled, everyone lives
in the region in which they were born and all workers work in the region in which they live. A
system with 50 km between the towns moves closer to this theoretical ideal than a system with
only 20 km. It is important to note that this is not the same as saying a system with a greater
distance between the towns experiences a higher level of utility, only that the ordering of utility
under different conditions changes with the distance i.e. a congestion charge is optimal when
the distance is long but gives reduced benefit as this distance decreases.
These results have important implications. One of the aims of this paper was to investigate
the regional labour market implications of congestion and congestion charging. It was stated
in the introduction that policy makers have demonstrated a preference for an even spread of
unemployment. The two experiments presented in this section give three conclusions. The first
is that regional disparities become more likely to emerge or are exacerbated when congestion
charging is used as they restrict the spatial integration between the regions. The second is that
the optimality of a congestion charge will depend on the response of commuters and particularly
the displaced commuters. If they engage in costly moving, then the social benefit of the charge
will be reduced and may be negative. Finally, in this model, the congestion charge relies on
creating unemployment disparities to effect an improvement in social welfare. This is a somewhat
disturbing conclusion given that it means securing welfare improvements thorough congestion
charging and an even distribution of unemployment may be incompatible goals.
14
3.3 Dynamic shocks
One unrealistic aspect of the experiments presented so far is that they model a transition from
one equilibrium to another. In such a case, spatial mismatch is a temporary phenomenon re-
stricted almost entirely to the inter-equilibrium period. In the real world context, matching
problems are important and occur continuously. This cannot be modelled with a static dis-
tribution of jobs. In order to explore outcomes when matching problems exist, the way jobs
are allocated between the regions was changed. Rather than an equal number of jobs in each
regions, a percentage of the total jobs in the system will move from one region to the other.
This will be done so there are enough jobs for 90% of the economically active population. Jobs
are divided between the towns according to Equations 8 and 9.
J1 = (0.1 ∗ sin(0.6 ∗ year + pi) + 0.9) ∗ 0.5 ∗ E (8)
J2 = (0.1 ∗ sin(0.6 ∗ year) + 0.9) ∗ 0.5 ∗ E (9)
The parameters of this relationship have no interpretation. The mechanisms is a purely me-
chanical way of moving jobs between the towns in order to simulate job search friction. This
relationship keeps the aggregate level of unemployment in the system constant but changes the
distribution of the jobs. The sine waves are offset by pi so that the peak in employment in
Town 1 corresponds exactly with the lowest employment in Town 2. Under this regime, changes
in migration and commuting flows are required to match workers with jobs. Unemployment
disparities in this system are presented in Figure 6.
The results here are consistent with those presented in Figure 1. The uncongested system
experiences the lowest level of unemployment disparities due to its high degree of flexibility. The
system with the most expensive commuting, i.e. with a congestion charge, has the highest level
of disparities. Although the ordering of the outcomes is the same as in the previous experiment,
the magnitude of the differences if greater. The system with congestion charging experiences
much higher disparities than either of the other two systems. Because the system is dynamic,
there are no persistent disparities. Population adjustment is presented in Figure 7 to show how
migration responds to the changes in the distribution of employment opportunities.
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Figure 6: Unemployment differential (T1-T2) with stochastic employment. Scenarios denoted
by: Uncongested - solid line, Congested - dashed line and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
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Figure 7: Population differential (T1-T2) with stochastic employment. Scenarios denoted by:
Uncongested - solid line, Congested - dashed line and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
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Once again, the results are consistent with those in the previous section. Migration is lowest
when there is an ample supply of road capacity. As the cost of commuting increases, migration
is substituted by many. As a result, it is highest in the case with a congestion charge. Figure 8
shows the average utility per worker for each of the three scenarios.
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Figure 8: Utility per worker with stochastic employment. Scenarios denoted by: Uncongested -
solid line, Congested - dashed line and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
Once again, the system with unlimited capacity provides the highest level of utility for the
average worker. There is, however, almost no discernible difference between the congested and
congestion charge scenarios. In some years the charge improves the situation while in others it
leads to a deterioration. There are two explanations for this. The first is the same explanation as
was outlined in the previous section. There are additional problems with the congestion charge
in this system. Firstly, because work places are constantly being moved, constant migration is
required. This means that transaction costs are continuously being extracted from the system.
The second reason is that agents make optimal decisions based on the information available to
them which may involve moving instead of commuting. If, however, they were aware that jobs
would eventually be moved back to their region, then they may choose to engage in short term
commuting or to enter short term unemployment.
In the previous section, an increase in distance led to the congestion charge system outper-
forming the uncharged system. The next section repeats repeats the dynamic experiments with
a greater distance between the towns.
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3.4 An increase in distance from 20 km to 50 km
Once again, the distance between the towns is increased and the system re-run. Figure 9 presents
a 10 year moving average of the absolute value of the unemployment disparity between the two
towns both with and without congestion charging.
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Figure 9: Utility per worker with stochastic employment. Scenarios denoted by: Congested -
dashed line and Congestion Charge - dotted line.
The increase in distance has a noticeable effect on the results of introducing a congestion
charge. The introduction of a charge now gives a significant improvement in utility, at least
on average. Once again, the explanation relates to the actions of the displaced commuters.
This congestion charge now generates larger unemployment disparities rather than population
disparities. The improvement is not quite as clear as in the static case presented in the previous
section. This is caused by the inability of agents to predict the future allocation of jobs. The
introduction of the congestion charge encourages additional moving even when there is a distance
of 50 km. It would have been better for these workers to engage in seemingly inefficient short-
term commuting than to move. In some years, this effect dominates and leads to a fall in utility.
However, overall, the majority of displaced commuters become unemployed rather than engaging
in costly commuting or migration.
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4 Infrastructure Investment
The previous set of experiments showed that a congestion charge did not significantly improve
social welfare when there was a short distance between the towns. There is, however, a degree
of market failure in this system given that people commute when their private marginal benefit
exceeds the marginal social cost. The introduction of a congestion charge was unable to correct
this because it encouraged moving which in turn encouraged other agents to engage in moving
and commuting. Instead of charging for congestion and then returning the charge to the popu-
lation, it is possible to retain the charge and then invest it improvements in infrastructure. In
order to test the implications of this, the charge collected from the 20 km system was retained
until a total of 1 billion NOK was collected. This is a typical kind of sum which would be
collected from commuters in Norway through road tolls in order to fund a road expansion. This
took a period of 18 years. After time, the capacity restriction was removed and the charge
abolished. The average annual utility before, during and after the toll collection period were
382,350, 380,026 and 383,568 respectively.
As can be seen, the introduction and collection of the charge results in a decline in utility.
Once the charge is abolished and the infrastructure upgraded, the level of utility increases.
The system also experiences a lower level of population and unemployment disparities after
the upgrade. In order to evaluate whether the investment is worthwhile, the net present value
(NPV) has to be calculated. The utility costs and benefits are calculated on a ‘per worker’ basis
and are compared to the ‘do-nothing’ scenario of unpriced congestion. The investment involves
lower utility for a period of 18 years followed by a potentially infinite period of higher utility.
As an assumption, the time horizon is restricted to a 100 year period. One key component in
calculating the NPV is the discount rate. The decision regarding whether a given investment is
worthwhile can be highly sensitive to the choice of rate. Figure 10 shows the NPV per worker
for the investment scenario using different discount rates.
As can be seen, there is little net benefit once the discount rate passes 2%. The rate used
by agents in the model is 7%. If this rate is used to evaluate the investment then there is no
significant return to the investment. It is not, however, clear which is the best rate to choose.
It is also unclear how to deal with the fact that the costs and benefits of a 100 year project will
be spread out over multiple generations. It has been argued that the conventional discounting
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Figure 10: NPV per worker (in terms of utility) for the investment scenario for different discount
rates.
methods should not be applied to investments which have intergenerational effects (e.g. Prager
and Shertzer, 2006; Sumaila and Walters, 2005; Weitzman, 1998; Henderson and Bateman, 1995;
Kula, 1988). Due to lack of agreement on how such investments should be evaluated, it seems
sensible to use conventional discounting with a rate of 7% since this is the rate used by agents in
the model. At this rate, the experiment shows that, under the assumptions used in the model,
it is not possible to improve welfare by using toll charges to invest in infrastructure.
There are, of course, costs and benefits which are not accounted for in this evaluation. For
instance, if the population were to increase over time, then the congestion problem would become
worse over time. In such a case, the increase in road capacity would be more beneficial than is
at first apparent. It could be the case that instead of solving the congestion problem, increasing
road capacity induces new commuting demand which leads to new congestion problems (Small
and Verhoef, 2007 p. 176). Assumptions also have to be made about economic activity. In the
experiment conducted here it is assumed that there are no agglomeration effects and that the
aggregate level of employment will be constant. Importantly, infrastructure investment led to
lower regional disparities. This may well be beneficial but a discussion of how this should be
valued is beyond the scope of this paper. Accounting for all of these potential costs and benefits
may well change the decision as to whether investment should be undertaken
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5 Conclusion
This paper has considered the labour market impacts of various policies for dealing with con-
gested infrastructure as well as the more traditional efficiency considerations. The first set of
experiments considered the transition from one equilibrium situation to another. The results
showed that unlimited capacity gave the highest level of utility. Results regarding the use of
congesting charging were somewhat surprising. Implementing a charge led to only a modest
improvement in the average level of utility. The explanation for observing only a modest im-
provement was found in the actions of the agents who had been discouraged from commuting
and their preferences to live in the region in which they were born. In addition, the use of con-
gestion charging caused a slightly higher level of unemployment disparities and a much larger
population differential to emerge. Further investigation where the distance in between the towns
in the model was increased showed that a congestion charge improved utility over a congested
situation because displaced commuters became unemployed rather than engaging in costly and
socially unnecessary migration.
The second set of experiments considered a situation where employment was cyclical and a
spatial mismatch between the two areas existed. The aim of these experiments was to try to
capture the effect of congestion on matching efficiency. The results in this set of experiments
differed from the first set. Once again, uncongested infrastructure provided the highest level
of utility. The introduction of a congestion charge had little discernible effect on utility. The
failure to realise any benefit was caused by the same factors as in the previous experiment and
the fact that transaction costs were repeatedly incurred rather than only being incurred after a
one-off shock. Once again, increasing the distance in the system meant that a congestion charge
performed significantly better on average than a system with unpriced congestion.
Both experiments demonstrated the importance of infrastructure to the regional adjustment
process. Uncongested connections between areas minimised disparities and maximised the utility
of agents in the economy. Congested infrastructure lowered utility and increased the level of
regional disparities. The introduction of a congestion charge made little difference to utility.
It also substantially increased regional disparities. Real world policy makers may be concerned
about the social impacts of such disparities even if they do not directly impact on utility in
this model. Such a concern suggests that society must have some positive willingness to pay
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to reduce regional disparities. Placing a monetary value on such benefits is difficult but it is
clear that a trade-off exists between the regional distribution of workers and the “efficient”
use of infrastructure. It is also clear that there are benefits to be derived from the flexibility
offered by adjustments taking place through commuting rather than migration. Interestingly,
the experiments in this paper show that the efficient operation of a congestion charge actually
relies on creating unemployment disparities.
These results highlight the fact that the implementation of a congestion charge is not a
straight forward process. The theory of optimal road pricing makes implicit assumptions about
the behaviour and utility functions of agents who stop commuting as the result of the introduc-
tion of a charge. In the model used in this paper, this led to the charge performing poorly and
even making the situation worse. Attention must be given to other costs and benefits in the
system and to distributional impacts of any policies. The analysis here has demonstrated that
different policies for dealing with congestion have significantly different impacts on the labour
markets. If society is not indifferent to such changes, then they must be taken into account
when designing and implementing road pricing systems.
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